14.06.2021 | History

5 edition of Changing the Boston school choice mechanism found in the catalog.

Changing the Boston school choice mechanism

1899-1917 : istoriko-bibliograficheskiĭ alʹbom-katalog

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Published by Administrator in National Bureau of Economic Research

    Places:
  • United States
    • Subjects:
    • National Bureau of Economic Research


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      • January 2006.Includes bibliographical references (p. 31-34).Also available in PDF from the NBER world wide web site (www.nber.org).

        StatementNational Bureau of Economic Research
        PublishersNational Bureau of Economic Research
        Classifications
        LC Classifications2006
        The Physical Object
        Paginationxvi, 134 p. :
        Number of Pages55
        ID Numbers
        ISBN 10nodata
        Series
        1
        2Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 11965.
        3NBER working paper series -- working paper 11965.

        nodata File Size: 3MB.


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Changing the Boston school choice mechanism by National Bureau of Economic Research Download PDF EPUB FB2


what procedure should be used to assign students to schools, remains hotly debated. In particular, we show that many unassigned students could have been assigned to one of their stated choices with a different strategy under the current mechanism. Search the world's most comprehensive index of full-text books. : Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality.

Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism

Under this mechanism a student loses his priority at a school unless his parents rank it as their first Size: KB. Boston University, Working Paper 2008• Search the world's most comprehensive index of full-text books.

The Boston education plan - phase one [Boston. : On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems. Series NBER working paper series -- working paper 11965. The Boston mechanism — Manipulable: Rank a school higher to improve the odds to get it — It produces a stable match in Nash equilibrium, there may beIt produces a stable match in Nash equilibrium, there may be many stable matches Ergin and Sonmez.

CiteSeerX — Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism

: A new solution to the random assignment problem. To see this point, note first that it is clear that a Boston mechanism in which every student is acceptable satisfies all the axioms in this alternative environment. Percentage and percentage distribution of homeschooled students ages 5 through 17 with a grade equivalent of kindergarten through gr by reasons their parents gave for File Size: 2MB.

We then discuss the considerations that led to the adoption of a deferred acceptance mechanism as opposed to the also strategy-proof top trading cycles mechanism.