5 edition of Changing the Boston school choice mechanism found in the catalog.
January 2006.Includes bibliographical references (p. 31-34).Also available in PDF from the NBER world wide web site (www.nber.org).
|Statement||National Bureau of Economic Research|
|Publishers||National Bureau of Economic Research|
|The Physical Object|
|Pagination||xvi, 134 p. :|
|Number of Pages||55|
|2||Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 11965.|
|3||NBER working paper series -- working paper 11965.|
nodata File Size: 3MB.
what procedure should be used to assign students to schools, remains hotly debated. In particular, we show that many unassigned students could have been assigned to one of their stated choices with a different strategy under the current mechanism. Search the world's most comprehensive index of full-text books. : Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality.
Under this mechanism a student loses his priority at a school unless his parents rank it as their ﬁrst Size: KB. Boston University, Working Paper 2008• Search the world's most comprehensive index of full-text books.
The Boston education plan - phase one [Boston. : On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems. Series NBER working paper series -- working paper 11965. The Boston mechanism — Manipulable: Rank a school higher to improve the odds to get it — It produces a stable match in Nash equilibrium, there may beIt produces a stable match in Nash equilibrium, there may be many stable matches Ergin and Sonmez.
: A new solution to the random assignment problem. To see this point, note first that it is clear that a Boston mechanism in which every student is acceptable satisfies all the axioms in this alternative environment. Percentage and percentage distribution of homeschooled students ages 5 through 17 with a grade equivalent of kindergarten through gr by reasons their parents gave for File Size: 2MB.
We then discuss the considerations that led to the adoption of a deferred acceptance mechanism as opposed to the also strategy-proof top trading cycles mechanism.
Roth and Tayfun SonmezCited by: In July the Boston School Committee voted to replace the existing Boston school choice mechanism with a deferred acceptance mechanism that simpliﬁes the strategic choices facing parents.
eds Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare.
: Constrained school choice: an experimental study.
: A tale of two mechanisms: student placement.
Yet, how to operationalize school choice, i.