2 edition of Does reform work? an econometric examination of the reform-growth puzzle found in the catalog.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 4/27/2007.Includes bibliographical references.Also available in print.System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.Mode of access: World Wide Web.
|The Physical Object|
|Pagination||xvi, 58 p. :|
|Number of Pages||83|
|2||Discussion paper (Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit : Online) -- no. 2638|
|3||Discussion paper -- no. 2638|
Why are socially beneficial reforms not implemented? One simple answer to this question (which has received little attention in the literature) is that this may be caused by generalized uncertainty about the effectiveness of reforms. If agents are unsure about whether a proposed reform will work, it will be less likely to be adopted. Despite the numerous benefits economists assign to structural reforms, the empirical literature has thus far failed to establish a positive and significant effect of reforms on economic performance. We collect data from 43 econometric studies (for more than 300 coefficients on the effects of reform on growth) and show that approximately one third of these coefficients is positive and significant, another third is negative and significant, and the final third is not statistically significant different from zero. In trying to understand this remarkable variation, we find that the measurement of reform and controlling for institutions and initial conditions are main factors in decreasing the probability of reporting a significant and positive effect of reform on growth--Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit web site. File Size: 2MB.
Remarkably, we observe that a third of the coefficients of reform on economic performance are positive and significant, another third is negative and significant, and the final third is not statistically significantly different from zero. Here we focus on the early transition period, where the shocks to these economies led to outcomes somewhat different from those observed in East Europe.
16 almost 80 percent are estimated on panel data, with just below a third of them addressing potential endogeneity bias and even fewer making allowances for fixed effects. With respect to reform, the existing measures are mostly subjective, dif-ficult to replicate and tend not to reflect reform reversals Campos and Horvath, 2006. A vast majority of specifications 21. Privatization in transition economies has affected employment directly, to some extent through lay-offs or retention in the case of insider-oriented privatizations of redundant workers, but also through the dynamism of restructured firms that have increased production and thus employment.
1995Unemployment, Restructuring and the Labor Market in Eastern Europe and Russia, World Bank, Washington. Section 3 presents the data set we put together for this pa-per. According to an approach suggested by Okunthe sample of 20 CEE countries has been split into four clusters this categorization is valid for 2016 basing on economic efficiency per capita income and social fairness Gini index criteria and analyzed with regard to the influence of separate factors on social welfare.
If recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with. pdf Abstract The paper analyzes the influence of credit- labor- and product market deregulation policies on economic growth in more than 70 economies over a period of 30 years.
We put together a unique data set covering more than 300 estimates of the effect of reform on growth from more than 40 different econometric studies. Ortmann, Andreas, and Ralph Hertwig. Yet this descriptive statistic cannot rep-resent such a diverse literature. An Econometric Examination of the Reform-Growth Puzzle. 91 Balkans 1994 1995 1996 1997 Albania 8.1999; Fidrmuc, 2001; Falcetti et al.
The elements of private property and private initiative, relatively well-balanced national economy, high willingness of the population to appreciate the market economy remained.
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23 Not all such establishments proved to be successful, and some owners took a passive approach, selling off the inventory of goods that they had inherited and then selling the business.